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1. Introduction
The future of urban public transport is a high agenda item as governments seek out more
efficient and effective ways of improving the quality of the natural environment. Issues of
air quality, global warming and traffic congestion have been important drivers of the
agenda for reform of the urban transport sector. As a very heterogenous set of
possibilities for change, public transport can be seen in its narrow guise as trains, buses
and ferries/jetcats. In its broader definition it can include taxis, ride sharing and even
walking as a recognition that the reduction in single-occupant automobility appears to be
a prime focus of arguments offered to revitalise public transport in urban areas.
The aim of this paper is to take a closer look at some of the challenges facing
governments who would like to support public transport if the case for its contribution
to urban sustainability (defined in many ways) is proven. The emphasis is on realistically
achievable and meaningful futures. We avoid the idea of desirable futures. The latter
construct is problematic in that ultimately ‘desirability’ comes down to a mix of fact and
emotional commitment to outcomes which have no guarantee of achieving the objectives
the proponent is looking for. The vexed issue of the role of alternative forms of
transport, especially different public transport facilities, in guiding the spatial
composition of urban activities remains controversial. We argue that each form of
transport is simply a medium for delivering urban futures in respect of improvements in
mobility, accessibility, equity, air quality, traffic congestion, global warming, residential
lifestyle, social justice and so on. The case for each and every form of transport should
rest on contributions to these criteria for change, as measures of meaningful futures.
Importantly individuals and enterprises must be given choices at efficient prices
accompanied by equity compensation packages where justified. We must avoid
organising and constraining individuals to support a particular urban structure or
transport technology, for example, to make it economical to operate a particular form of
public transport which serves the interests of planners, transport operators and owners of
property. The role of government is primarily to nagehis process, and not to meddle
in it.
The title of the paper emphasises technology, pricing and management systems futures.
This should be interpreted to include the selection of appropriate public transport modes,
especially the debate about the role of bus and rail-based systems; the role that pricing
plays in positioning public transport in the various transport markets (with consideration
of the justification of subsidies), and the alternative ways in which public transport can be
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delivered to the market, including private-public partnerships to share the risk,
privatisation, corporatisation and competitive tendering.
2. The Challenges Facing Urban Public Transport
There are numerous reports and papers promoting the virtues and limitations of urban
public transport, rail systems in particular, as a panacea for ‘solving’ the ills of urban
society. On the one hand we have the proponents of heavy and light rail arguing that
there is a very definite link between the density of cities and levels of traffic (measured in
many dimensions such as vehicle kilometres, passenger kilometres, energy consumption
per capita); extending their arguments to suggest that the presence of rail systems is an
instrument for ‘causing’ higher densities of urban activity (e.g. Newman and Kenworthy
1989). On the other hand we have the proponents of arguments which do not support
any one form of transportation per se, but who look to the historical evidence in various
countries, consider the foundations for historical and current pricing and investment
strategies and who use a mix of economic, political, cultural and physical planning ethos
to guide a view of the future (e.g. Wachs 1993, Hensher 1993). The ‘dominating’ or
growing role of the automobile evolves from this literature.
It is difficult (and maybe not necessary) to classify the two views of the future of urban
public transport, but past attempts to do so have suggested (possibly incorrectly) that the
two schools of thought are best distinguished by paradigms of the role of physical
planning, markets (ie. consumer preferences) and government intervention in achieving
change consistent with the broad set of improvements societies are aspiring to. I would
suggest that the central issue that should concern us is the extent to which the choices of
individuals and enterprises are allowed to influence outcomes, provided the full costs of
their actions are paid by the beneficiaries. It is not the intention herein to take a position
on these two schools of thought - the debate is documented in many papers such as
Brindle 1992, 1992a, Kirwan 1992, Newman et al. 1993, Hensher 1993, Troy 1994,
Downs 1992, Breheny 1994 and Lave 1992. Our purpose is to look at the forces at work
in shaping urban areas which are important challenges for the future of transport systems
in general and urban public transport in particular. The interpretation of outcomes under
reasonable assumptions about pricing futures suggest diverse futures for each form of
public transport.
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2.1 The Changing face of urban society
Figure 1 provides a synthesis of some key elements of the changing face of societies
throughout the western world which are impacting on the future of urban public
transport. These evolutionary changes are as applicable to countries with historically
stronger urban public transport such as many Western European countries and Canada,
as they are to countries which have run down their public transport in the last 50 years
and are now trying to reverse this trend. The USA is the notable example. The key
influences on change in the urban passenger transport sector include the changing
composition of the labour force and work schedules, the suburbanisation of work
opportunities and the accompanying loss of high-density mobility corridors (but an
increasing number of low density corridors suitable for bus systems), the changing
incidence of the population in each life cycle stage, the commitment or lack thereof from
government to pricing and planning/regulatory reforms, the growing awareness and
acceptance of user or beneficiary charges, and the greening of the automobile and energy
sectors.
2.2. The Western Europe Myth: “Don’t look to the USA, look to Europe for guidance on
the Future of Urban Public Transport”
The encyclopedic account of tradition and transition in European travel patterns in
Salomon et al. (1993) portrayed as a ‘billion trips a day’ shows an increasing rate of
growth of car ownership (in fact nearly three times that of the USA - Lave (1992)),
declining household size, suburbanising residential location and the decline of the central
city as the dominating focus of activity. The annual growth rate in personal mobility from
1970 to 1987 associated with private modes in Europe varies from a low of 1.7% in
Sweden to a high of 6.8% in Portugal (with most countries around 3%). The use of
public transport grew at a negative rate in the U.K. (-.9%) and Belgium (-.4%) and up to
3.6% in Denmark (with most countries between 1% and 2%) (Bovy et al. 1993). The
share of mobility contributed by the private car increased from 79% to 83% during this
period. Italy has one of highest modal splits for urban public transport (26%), with a low
of 4.8% in the Netherlands, and a typical percentage share of 11-19% throughout
Western Europe. The 1991 Sydney Travel Survey shows a train share of 3.7% and a bus
share of 4.3%. These downward trends in use of urban public transport are aligned with
the reduction in the proportion of all work trips to the central core of major urban areas
(see below). These trends are strong and consistent with global evidence that such
phenomena occur as the wealth base of the population increases. If one accepts the
Newman-Kenworthy density hypothesis, this is not good news for forms of public
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transport which require high density traffic corridors to justify both the continuation of
existing services, enhancement by new investment and the application of justified subsidy
based on community service obligation or what might be better referred to as urban
distributive justice.
The Challenge for
UrbanPublic Transport
Suburbanisation of
work opportunities
Spreading of
working hours
Increased incidence
of exposure to a single
'peak' period per person
Greening of the
automobile industry
Greening of the
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Figure 1. The Challenges for Urban Public Transport
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2.3 Is the current debate on the future of particular forms of urban public transport
distorted?
Should we attempt to slow down the key determinants of mobility and accessibility?
What is the gain in so doing? Many of the changes to date may be an efficient response
to the accumulating benefits derived by new opportunities. Is the name of the game to
suppress opportunities or to force-channel the opportunities to particular forms of
transportation which may not be able to deliver as efficient and effective service for the
same ratio of benefits to costs? Suppression of opportunities should be discouraged.
Redistribution may be appealing; however the real future of expensive forms of public
transport may never be adequately determined with the current regime of myopic
planning horizons (a maximum of 25 years is legally possible in NSW) and high real
discount rates which require an early return of the benefits. Maybe however the dynamic
nature of urban activity and the influence of technological innovation is such than any
static planning constructs are doomed to fail, no matter how far into the future we apply
them and what discount rate we select.
Who would have suggested 25 years ago that the micro-computer, the fax, the mobile
phone, the incidence of women in the work force, the huge improvements in the fuel
consumption of automobiles and the development of ‘just-in-time’ opportunities in
retailing, the blurring of the boundaries between retailing and wholesaling, 24 hour
shopping and extended weekend hours would have had such an important influence on
the patterns of commuting and non-commuting activity? One important message that
comes with this commentary is the need to keep options open in the planning process.
Another way of saying this, given that decisions do have to be made and funds
committed, is that transport systems (and planning processes) which are flexible in terms
of adjusting to accommodate changing patterns of spatial and temporal activity will be of
greater value to societies experiencing continual change. Urban areas will always be in a
state of change. Fixed-track public transport systems are at an inherent disadvantage -
they signal the inevitable need for some substantial financial support unrelated to the
ideals of community service obligation and environmental protection. Furthermore they
absorb substantial sums of money which might have been better spent on other more
flexible forms of public transport. So we get a double whammy.
Arguments currently used to defend additional investment in rail systems (be they heavy
or light rail) in preference to technologically advanced bus systems (eg bus priority
systems) are on extremely shaky ground. Hensher and Waters (1994) document the
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arguments and reject the position taken by advocates of rail systems in preference to bus
systems that only a rail system can ensure permanence and visibility of public transport.
We do however recognise the perception that buses have an image problem compared to
rail; but that this can be overcome. Hensher and Waters also question the view that rail
systems alone have desirable properties in respect of urban structure; we would argue
that all forms of transport can have desirable (and sometimes undesirable) properties in
respect of the criteria for contribution set out at the beginning of the paper provided we
price right, regulate properly and allow individual’s preferences to influence the final
outcomes.
Our conclusion from the available evidence is that any transport infrastructure
investment will have a significant impact on land use where it contributes in a non-
marginal way to accessibility, regardless of its nature. For example, Ottawa and Curitiba
(Brazil) introduced extensive busway systems accompanied by legislation. Ottawa's
legislatively mandated land use and transportation plan gives precedence to public transit
over all forms of road construction or road widening, with planning regulations requiring
developers to concentrate developments near transit, to orient buildings and private
access to transit stops, to provide walkways and transit-only roadways through
developments, and to enter into agreements with the municipality on matters such as
staging construction to accommodate transit.  Curitiba, a city of 1.6 million located 400
kilometres south west of Sao Paulo, implemented a master plan in the late sixties which
restricted high-density growth to several slender corridors radiating from the city centre.
The traditional core has given way to a cluster of high rises and scattered outlying
development with all tall buildings arrayed along five transportation axes. Express
busways occupy the median of each road. To achieve this, the city brought or
condemned a substantial amount of land along or close to the transportation axes and
enacted zoning regulations that restricted high-density development to a two-to four-
block corridor on both sides of the road. Flower street, an auto-free downtown
pedestrian zone was created, banishing cars in a 17-block area.
A Lesson: The message is very clear: a metropolitan strategy can embed an effective bus-
based system within its overall land use/transport plan which can produce the same types
of impacts as rail. What is required is enabling legislation with a mandated urban
form/transport plan which explicitly prioritises the role of bus-based systems. This whole
process of strategy planning must recognise that the objective of promoting public
transport per se is fallacious - just as the promotion of particular land use patterns and
urban form is fallacious. The key issue is the establishment of planning frameworks
which enable us to identify directions of change which are consistent with ‘moving in the
right direction’ with respect to the agreed set of criteria that define progress (without
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necessarily knowing the extent and timing of the impacts); and furthermore that the
planning process is sufficiently flexible to adjust over time for technological progress and
changing individual preferences consistent with ‘correct’ pricing signals. It must be
stated that establishing consumer choices under a regime of efficient prices does not
solve the investment decision - this must be decided on broader benefit-cost criteria,
including an allowance for the very real possibility that information available today on
technological opportunities, social norms etc. is not sufficiently reliable to give a
meaningful description of the future. The ‘solution’ then is the establishment of flexible
transport options which can readily adapt to the evolving changes in consumer demand.
To what extent then can changes consistent with sustainable mobility be best achieved by
massive investment in rail systems, and/or road systems and/or through the
encouragement of other strategies focussed on broader objectives such as spatial and
temporal changes in workplace locations and working hours (Hensher et al. 1994).
2.4 The fear that road pricing will emasculate the rail system under likely funding
regimes, even though it will raise lots of dollars
Location-specific road pricing where the wider set of costs of using the system are
recovered from users has been promoted by economists for decades. The technology to
implement it is now available; what is missing is the political will, although in some
countries it has progressed to trials. One fear of the consequences of road pricing is that
there will be a massive switch to public transport. Meersman and Van de Voorde (1993)
suggest that if 10% of Belgium car users were to switch to the train, the capacity of the
rail system would have to increase by no less than 75%, implying very serious financial
consequences. This is unlikely to occur.  Small (1991), in evaluating what might happen
in terms of the type of adjustment that our societies will make to diminish the potential
adverse environmental impacts of transportation activities, concludes that  “People need
not and will not choose solutions that reverse the trends toward increased mobility via
personal vehicles”. It is likely that peak spreading, exposure to single peak period for
commuting and the relocation of activities are already acting to improve the efficiency of
the existing transport infrastructure - especially the road network.
Currently the levels of service offered by rail systems to those using the car carry a much
higher generalised cost of travel than the car trip. To entice switching if that is deemed
desirable, levels of train service in terms of in-vehicle and interchange times will have to
be increased substantially to ensure that the increased net disutility associated with the
use of the automobile attributed to higher monetary costs but improved travel times is
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more than offset by the elimination of the disutility gap.  For this to happen in the rail
context, massive investment in urban rail systems will be required.
The revenues from a congestion pricing strategy however are likely to be so large
(Goodwin et al. 1991) that for the first time there will be sufficient ann al funds to
offset negative impacts, promote social goals and obtain political support from interest
groups (Small 1992). For automobiles only (i.e. excluding trucks and buses),
approximately $4bn per annum for all of Australia’s capital cities would be available
(based on a congestion charge of 10 cents per kilometre). (Note that users of the M4
motorway in Sydney pay a toll of $1.50, which given an average distance travelled on
the M4 of 15 km, equates to 10 cents/km).  This approximates the current annual
receipts from fuel and sales taxes on automobiles. Current taxes are not strictly charges
(indeed the debate on the incidence of a charge and a tax is still open). Consequently the
case for earmarking back to the transport sector must allow for some amount of revenue
from congestion pricing going into consolidated revenue where there is substitution with
current sales and fuel taxes. A congestion pricing scheme is unlikely to be revenue
neutral from a government point of view, in respect of lost revenue from reduced sales
and fuel taxes. Some of the revenue can substitute for general taxes now used to pay for
transport services, but a significant visible amount should be allocated as monetary
reimbursement to travellers as a whole and to the provision of new transport services.
The Federal and State governments will be no worse off; they almost certainly will be
better off. Small (1992) proposes that two-thirds be earmarked to transportation users
and facilities.
2. 5 Greening of the automobile and energy sectors
The greening of the automobile and fuel industry has been progressing quite markedly in
the last 10 years, even though there is still a long way to go. The most notable
improvements in fuel consumption (litres per 100km) have occurred in the USA from a
dismal base of nearly 17 litres per 100 km in 1970 to 12 litres per 100 km in 1990;
approaching the European average of 9 litres per 100 km (Schipper et al. 1993). Fuel
consumption alone however is not an adequate indicator of the ‘greening’ process for
automobiles - the patterns and intensity of automobile use must be considered. Given
fuel prices, an improvement in fuel consumption is expected to increase the demand for
vehicle kilometres, ceteris paribus. Although the net effect is likely to be a reduction in
fuel use per capita, greening of the automobile without support from efficient vehicle use
charges ( or a vehicle quota system and/or a weekend car scheme as introduced into
Singapore - Olszewski and Turner 1993) will only support further automobile ownership
and use. This is not necessarily bad. This has implications for the role of public transport.
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Relatively higher fuel prices in Europe as a ratio of public transport fares is one
important contributor to the higher share of urban commuting by public transport.
However the gap is closing on modal shares for other reasons.
2.6. Looking for Niches: Now you are talking sense
Why do we continue to subsidise all urban public transport users so that we can transfer
benefits to the sub-population who create the need for a community service obligation
(CSO)? Or is a CSO a reflection of a broader obligation which has arisen through
government failure to assist the market to operate under efficient socialprices on all
competing modes and to include these efficient prices in an investment appraisal which
might guide the selection of price-efficient passenger transport investments? This is not
an easy set of questions to answer. The position here is that until market efficiency of the
first best type is permissible the second-best competitive efficiency pricing regime is used
to justify low public transport fares. Consequently we have a mixing of inefficiency and
redistributive injustice in our fare structures.
The international and local evidence tells us repeatedly that individuals most likely to use
public transport are school children, households with low household incomes (but not
necessarily low personal incomes for multi-worker households), a declining proportion
of the elderly (those without drivers licences or who are physically unable to drive and
who have limited access to support networks which provide private or community car-
based transport), those who have no automobile available in the household,  who live in
a central city and work in or adjacent to the central business district, and who live in a
densely settled area. In the context of the commuting trip, workers satisfying these
criteria typically exhibit a public transport use in excess of 70% in many cities. Such
workers however are a declining percentage of the workforce. For example, in the USA
they are 4.7% of all commuters in 1980 and even less today. In Western Europe in large
cities such as Paris we find that the share of commuters living in/near and working in the
central city is 17% and declining, with massive growth of commuting from persons living
and working in the suburbs  - 48% of commuters in 1982 (Jansen 1993).
Pushkarev and Zupan (1977), a much cited book by proponents of rail systems state on
pages 172-73 that “...from the transit viewpoint, it [would be] much more ‘profitable’ to
gain riders either from restraints on automobile use or from increased density of urban
development”. Wachs (1993) argues that while traffic reduction by urban density
increases has become increasingly popular among environmentalists and urban reformers,
many scholars have demonstrated that low density development patterns do not
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necessarily result in heavier traffic congestion. There is little empirical evidence which
persuades many that this approach is fundamentally sound. Authors such as Newman and
Kenworthy “demonstrate” that higher density cities generate fewer trips and lower
energy consumption per capita than lower density cities. They show this by comparing
different cities at one point in time at various stages in their historical development,
rather than tracking particular cities over decades. This runs into the problem of
ecological correlation or spurious causality. An ecological fallacy is the product of falsely
inferring that what is true of different ecologies or groups (ie. a comparison of cities at a
point in time) is true of individuals (ie a city over time):
“[In Newman and Kenworthy] ...Los Angeles is compared with Hong Kong
or New York in order to reach the conclusion that density can make the
intended difference, but there is no guarantee that the adoption of Hong
Kong or New York style densities [any more than Singapore’s car quota
system] would result in the intended outcome. In fact, most of the high
density cities which are cited as examples were major metropolises long
before the coming of the automobile, and over time they are becoming less
dense as lower density suburbs are added at their peripheries and as higher
rates of automobile ownership occur in these cities in response to rising
incomes” (Wachs 1993, 348).
Two of public transport’s most natural markets, relatively low income inner-city
residents and high income commuters accessing medium-to-high density corridors
leading to the central business district need niche treatment. Expanding public transport
rail services far into suburban areas in contexts where we are loosing the dense corridors
linked to a major destination is precisely what has the least market potential. Improving
bus services however may have a more appealing role. Investing in new rail systems as
an isolated strategy is a very expensive way of attacking the general problem. The
results where this has been undertaken in urban areas with a dominating automobility
have been disappointing - low ridership, and debilitating subsidies (Hensher and Waters
1994).
The blue line in Los Angeles is indicative of an outcome. The Blue Line has a taxpayer
cost of $US21 per rider per day. Since few of its riders are former drivers (as opposed to
bus users), the system costs taxpayers $US37,489 per year for every car it currently
removes from the freeways. A comparison of the life cycle costs of providing bus
services compared to light rail in Los Angeles (using the construction and budgeted
operating costs of the LRT Blue Line) leads to a conclusion that for the same level of
funding, Los Angeles can either afford to build and operate the Blue Line for 30 years or
operate 430 buses for 33 years, including the cost of building the operating divisions to
support these new buses. For the same cost, however, the buses would produce over
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four-and-one-half times as many passenger kilometres and carry over nine times as many
passengers (Rubin 1991). This result is reached even though the assumptions made
tended to favour the Blue Line on several important issues. Buses, especially bus priority
systems are better value for money and if designed properly can have the essential
characteristicity of permanence and visibility claimed to be important to attract property
development along the route which is compatible with medium to high density corridor
mobility.
2.7 Changing Work Schedules Will be a Challenge to Urban Public Transport: The
Income and Convenience Effects
Working hours are spreading, with a growing proportion of shorter working hours and a
growing incidence of longer working hours (normal plus overtime) (Hensher et al. 1994).
This is spreading across the genders. The reduction in travel time associated with shorter
working hours contributes to reducing traffic congestion (at least in one of the peak
periods); the extended working hours have the same effect, notably in the evening peak
period. The increased time available for non-commuting by part-time workers will
contribute to an increase in off-peak vehicle use and hence help to flatten the peak. That
is, we are likely to see a flatter profile of vehicle kilometres by time of day throughout
the day. This is a desirable outcome for road investment, contributing to making better
use of the infrastructure, subject to optimal capacity being in place. The program of
future investment in public transport (and roads) will need to take this into account. One
of the major ways people respond to congestion is to decentralise their jobs and
residence. The paradoxical finding for the road system is that even while congestion on
specific facilities has become worse, the average speed encountered by commuters has
not.
At the same time that work practices are loosening up, more and more jobs are being
suburbanised in part due to firms (ie. jobs) following people. The shorter work trips will
also spread over an even longer ‘peak’. The combination of increased flexibility in work
schedules, job suburbanisation and peak spreading will work against the future of public
transport, especially rail public transport which requires a relatively dense corridor of
movement activity to be economically and environmentally sustainable. Radially biased
high density public transport corridors are losing their growth opportunities, even though
preserving in many instances their patronage. The automobile will continue to preserve
its dominating role.
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2.8 If an Objective of Improved Public Transport is to Contain Urban Density in the
interest of Improving Mobility, it may be Misjudged
The most noticeable observation around the world is that at the same time that urban
densities are declining, the average commuting time has remained relatively constant.
Shorter trip times are spreading across both genders for an increasingly higher proportion
of commuters. The growing incidence of part time work, primarily by females has
compensated the increasing traffic congestion to keep average work travel times
relatively constant over the last 20 years. The 1971 Sydney Area Transport Study for
example, reports an average commuting time of close to 25 minutes, similar to the mean
of 25 minutes from the 1981 Sydney Region Travel Survey. An exposure survey
undertake on behalf of the Federal Office of Road Safety shows that the average trip
length in 1986 of a male worker in Sydney was 28.7 minutes when full-time employed
and 25.2 minutes when part-time employed; for female workers the respective averages
are 25.5 and 23.9 minutes. The average travel time in 1986 was 27 minutes, supporting
the stability of mean commuting trip times over time.
2.9 Look what I did - I introduced congesting pricing and implemented regulations
designed to ensure that the environmental costs of travel actions were covered
The story goes something like this: “... when I said that I had built a light rail system, a
major toll road, a bus interchange and it cost $x million there was a sense of
achievement. A politician even had her name engraved in a monument to record the
opening of the facility. Congratulations all round. However when I introduced
congestion pricing and a range of regulations to ensure the protection of the
environment, the cutose was not forthcoming.” The net benefits to society were however
much greater, but hardly visible to the same extent - after all the efficiency of the actions
yielded revenue - it had less concentrated evidence of spending the taxpayers money.
This in essence is a dilemma facing governments.
2.10 What is the main message so far?
The future of urban public transport as an efficient and effective way of providing
transport services must recognise that in the main it is a provider to niche markets. The
set of current markets should not be held onto and used in the argument for expanding
the network. The links between particular forms of public transport, land use and the
protection of the environment are quite weak. The salient issue which must be better
understood in the debate is that all forms of infrastructure and associated service levels
can have outcomes which move societies in the right direction in respect of the criteria
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for assessing the contribution of transport systems to the performance of urban areas.
Central to achieving beneficial change is the establishment of the right pricing and
regulatory signals. Consequent to this, the preferences of individuals and enterprises
should be allowed to evolve and be revealed through choices in the market. The
importance of choice rather than blind commitment to particular technologies should be
paramount.
To ensure that the planning process is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the
uncertainties of the future, it is important that transport investment be itself flexible in
nature and able to adjust to changing needs within a framework of efficient pricing and
regulatory signals. When the changing spatial, temporal and socio-demographic patterns
are fully digested they throw up very strong signals about the future of fixed-track
systems compared to flexible forms of public transport. As we improve our
understanding of the links between public transport, urban activity densities and
environmental impact, we find the debate on the future of rail public transport as a
significant panacea extremely fragile. The broader set of less expensive public transport
options (bus priority systems in particular) become very appealing.
This provides a convenient link to an assessment of alternative institutional structures for
delivering public transport services once it is deemed that they are the best way of
servicing particular markets.
3. The Institutional Setting of the Provision of Urban Public transport
The justification of urban public transport in terms of a market to be served is paramount
in the assessment of its future. However the need to service a market in the most efficient
and effective way has to be linked to the determination of service levels and prices to
charge. This applies under all pricing strategies, be it profit maximisation (set prices to
satisfy MR = MC), social welfare maximisation (price = MC) or constrained social
welfare maximisation (prices set subject to average cost being covered). In discussing
alternative institutional settings one has to establish the nature of competition and the
objective driving government involvement in the past and the need or otherwise to be
involved in the future in the supply of services. We limit the discussion to the provision
of scheduled services by bus and rail. Unscheduled service markets such as charters and
tours and school contracts, for example are predominantly left to market forces.
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Urban public transport futures are likely to see an increasing involvement of the private
sector. Already the private sector operates urban bus services and participates in the
provision of non-direct transport services to the rail system (eg. catering, cleaning,
maintenance). Studies undertaken by Hensher (1993) and others have shown that private
participation can yield higher levels of overall productivity without a diminution in
service levels. Total subsidy from the State is also reduced, and in some instances not
required at all. There is much which can still be done in the urban public transport sector
to improve the costs of delivering a given level of service, once a market for provision is
worthy of public transport involvement. In this section we take a look at some
opportunities to improve the efficiency of bus and rail provision through privatisation,
joint venturing, and value capture.
We look separately at the urban bus and urban passenger rail sectors, because they have
some distinguishing characteristics in terms of institutional organisation. However the
principles for evaluating alternative institutional structures are the same. Before looking
at buses and railways, we need to introduce some simple yet important ideas as a way of
capturing the opportunities for reform.
3.1 Classifying Operating Contexts
The starting position is to take existing government trading enterprises (GTE’s) as the
traditional suppliers of urban scheduled passenger services in Australia. This is certainly
true for the railways and the provision of bus services in the central areas of cities.
Private bus operators provide services in the outer urban areas in a number of capital
cities. An important distinction has to be made between the influence of the market and
the influence of ownership in establishing the performance credentials of a GTE. There is
an extensive literature on the role that ownership and market forces play in the
determination of the efficiency and effectiveness of service provision. We will not address
this literature here. However what we need to address is some appreciation of what types
of markets the suppliers of scheduled bus and train services are likely to face when we
allow for alternative competitive environments. The issues of interest include establishing
(i) the presence of natural monopoly or active competition in the market, (ii) the presence
of potential competition for the market and (iii) the role of the regulator (independent of
government). Figure 2 provides a useful schematic representation of the alternative
market contexts (Hensher, in progress).
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3.2 The Scheduled Bus Market: Where is it heading ?
As a conservative response to pressures to use the market as the final arbiter of optimal
service supply, competitive tendering is being introduced systematically throughout a
growing number of countries. The tendering philosophy is diversifying into many
interpretations or "models" of the tendering process (Hensher 1989). The most widely
implemented model is the UK model which, in London, emphasises cost-only contracts
and, outside of London, bottom-line or minimum subsidy contracts.  Outside of London,
tendering is confined to situations where commercial provision of services has not
followed economic deregulation.
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Figure 2. Alternative Market Contexts
Recent developments in Australia and New Zealand offer alternative models. The
Australian model introduced into NSW in the 1990 NSW Passenger Transport Act is a
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major variation. This Act, applicable to all private operators and the STA, converts all
existing urban spatial monopoly rights into contracts. It emphasises the need to ensure
that the incumbent operators in the private sector are given a 5-year period to satisfy the
minimum levels of service, as a recognition of their historical contribution. This period
of grace also applies in principle to the STA.
The NSW model is characterised by competitive franchising which guarantees the supply
of services by a single operator in a predefined spatial context. All incumbents are given
the first opportunity to conform with the service requirements, leaving undefined the
precise routes. The service standards have to be satisfied according to key influences on
the role of bus transport such as population density and car ownership rates. The
services provided of a commercial nature are supplied jointly with the provision of
school services whose costs are reimbursed under a "school subsidy travel scheme"
(SSTS). If an operator chooses not to provide the (minimum) level of service specified
under the Act, then the services will be put out to competitive tender. An incumbent can
opt immediately to withdraw or can use the 5-year period of grace to make all efforts to
conform to the minimum levels of service. Holding the subsidy constant, the minimum
service level initially suggests more value for money where services have to be
upgraded. The 20-25% gain in cost efficiency commonly found (for example in London)
when a public service is put out to competitive tender (see Domberger 1989) is unlikely
to be as great in the context of transforming the lean services of the NSW private bus
operators to competitive regulation. Service levels however are showing signs of major
improvement; for example the recent introduction of a high frequency hail n'ride mini-
bus service, "the Nepean Nipper", by Westbus.
The Victorian government is currently evaluating the NSW model together with
prospects for privatisation of the government bus fleet. Queensland has recently
supported legislation (yet to be implemented) similar to that in NSW. The NSW and
Queensland Acts apply to both private and public operators although in the case of
NSW the STA has only been subject to the Act for two years. Ultimately we can expect
some test cases of competitive tendering of operating areas currently under the control
of the STA. In South Australia plans are in progress to have a number of individual
routes put out to competitive tendering. West Australia is also implementing a tendering
strategy. With the exception of nightride and Countrylink tenders in NSW, route-level
tendering has not been adopted to date in Australia. South Australia will be the first. The
reasoning for this is outlined in the next sub-section.
The New Zealand model is based on the UK 1985 legislation as applied outside London.
It is broader in that it embraces all passenger transport modes. Although promoted as
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"deregulation" the NZ approach evolved as part of the process leading up to the
commencement of the Act on 1 July 1991.  It is much more akin to competitive
tendering with procedural variations.  Commercial registration is permitted but unlike
the UK model, there are a number of planning instruments which act as negative
incentives to commercial registration. The consequence is a predominance of minimum-
subsidy tenders. All contracts are for areas and not individual routes. Regional Councils
can substantially influence the setting of service and fare levels, and are able to preclude
commercial services to secure desired service and fare policies. The latter contrasts with
the UK model in which the bottom-line tender is a "last resort" facility, adapted to what
the commercial market reveals.  Incumbents received a non-mandatory price preference
up to 25% prior to July 1992 and then up to 12.5% up to June 1993. Any single
application of this rule requires its application to be extended equitably to all existing
operators in the area under the jurisdiction of a Regional Council.
In the transitional stage, the NZ model has been modified continually in order to
minimise "disruption" to incumbent bus operators. A fixed infrastructure subsidy is paid
to incumbent rail and ferry operators. The initial result of the procedures laid down is a
16% reduction in subsidy with very little change to the overall provision of service.
A distinction must be made between the transitional and longer term impacts of
competitively and non-competitively based reforms. Whether the appropriate incentives
are in place to ensure real efficiency gains in the longer term application of competitive
tendering/franchising remains to be proven. The priority on the development of
comprehensive performance monitoring procedures is becoming clearer as more
heterogeneity occurs in the reform procedures. The NZ model is the most
"comprehensive" and also the most unwieldy. The NSW model is very conservative but
identifiable. In both cases, the desire to protect the incumbent is paramount.
3.3 What  is the scheduled bus market likely to look like?
There have been a number of important monitoring exercises in the British context
designed to evaluate the benefits and costs of competitive tendering and economic
deregulation. The most notable studies are by Evans (1990a,b and 1991), Preston (1991,
1993), Turner and White (1991) and White and Tough (1993). In drawing on the
ongoing British experience we have to recognise that there was not historically a well
established set of private sector incumbents to give the market a head start, in contrast to
the NSW situation.
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It has been suggested that local bus service markets display natural monopoly traits.
When considering the case of a natural monopoly, we have to take into account
operating costs as well as user cost and service integrity. The case for or against a
natural monopoly should not rest solely with the narrow operator cost exposition that a
natural monopoly exists where the total cost of supplying a service is lower if the service
is supplied by one operator rather than a number of operators. This may well be the
context in which some commentators rest their case. This is linked to the scale argument,
and typically draws on economic studies which conclude that local bus services exhibit
approximately constant returns to scale for the broad range of firm sizes. Firm size (with
no allowance for network integrity) is used in these studies as the only quantitative
measure of scale. The British experience has found no evidence to support the natural
monopoly argument on the grounds of operator size.
Size however does notcapture scope and network integrity. The opportunity to develop
different types of networks (associated with the phenomenon of economies of density or
integrity of service) raises a totally different argument. A single operator may be able to
provide a better service to passengers than several operators using the same combined
resources. A 'better service' is one with lower average user costs (Evans 1990a, page
263). With a greater prospect of attracting patronage to one's services, a single operator
can schedule more integrated and hence convenient services than the combined schedules
of more than one operator. Connections could be more convenient as well as ticketing
(although  inter-operator ticketing could be envisioned, but it would be rather messy)
and information dissemination. This is not the same as inter-modal ticketing between
monopoly bus operators serving different unique locations, such as exists currently in
Sydney between a private operator and the State Transit Authority.
A number of authors have hinted at the likelihood that the local bus industry has
characteristics which suggest that the savings from economies of scope outweigh the
costs of any monopoly power. The evidence does not support this view in general. The
presence of slight natural monopoly may be sufficient to support only one firm, which
could then use its monopoly power as it chooses, knowing it can always respond to
entrants. The welfare gains from being one firm might be greater than the loss from
abuse of monopoly power. However, efficient regulation should be able to (nearly)
eliminate the deadweight loss from the monopoly power, and a regulated natural
monopoly may be the constrained optimal solution. Under a competition policy driven by
constrained social welfare maximisation, yardstick regulation, price and quality controls,
any monopoly power in practice should either be absent or being progressively
eliminated over time. The success will depend on the effectiveness of the instruments
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currently in place which represent competition policy under constrained social welfare
maximisation.
After five years of economic deregulation in the U.K., outside of London, urban bus
service integration has proven difficult. Scheduled headways are more haphazard on
competitive routes than on monopoly-operated routes. Hence average passenger waiting
times are longer than they need be in relation to the frequency provided. Another way of
saying this is that current average waiting times could be achieved with fewer resources
if the services were better integrated. Ther  exist economies of service integration.  The
quality of overall output is important.
The increased bus kilometres offered by deregulation has not been matched by increased
patronage. It has remained almost static overall. The reasons given for this are:
a. Scheduling inefficiency has led to wasted bus kilometres, and
b. Competing services are inconvenient for passengers in other ways:
haphazard headways are difficult to remember, complete information may
be less readily available, competing schedules are frequently changed,
competing buses are more likely to run off-schedule, and tickets of
competing operators are not inter available.
Some economists have argued that bus routes have economies of scale because user
costs fall with increasing patronage even if the costs of providing the service do not.
This generates the case for subsidy to encourage more frequent services, provided we
have economically efficient fares under social welfare maximisation or average-cost
recovery fares under constrained social welfare maximisation. Since user costs (i.e the
fare, walking, waiting and linehaul time) represent a significant component of the total
cost of a typical local urban bus trip (than say for example they do for airline trips), the
importance of user costs in the final determination must be given great importance.
Integration directly affects these user costs, which must be weighed against competition
in the assessment.
Preston (1993) in a comprehensive analysis of competition policy in the British bus
industry, suggests that when user costs are taken into account (i.e. the Mohring effect),
there may be some basis for describing the industry as a case for a strong natural
monopoly because marginal cost pricing will lead to deficits. It is worth noting however
that the natural monopoly applies to local scheduled route services and school services,
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but excludes charters and tours except to the extent that this last category contributes to
positive economies of scope (which are separate from the network integrity effect).
Since the evidence points towards economies of integration, and that competitive route
services are less convenient for passengers than a service of a single operator using the
same resources, there is appealing evidence that local urban bus operations at the area
level are natural monopolies. Importantly also, in spite of the removal of legal barriers to
competition in the U.K., most local urban bus services have remained as monopolies
(with some adjustment during the three years with operators entering and leaving various
markets).
It is important to be clear on one thing - the Mohring argument does not imply natural
monopoly, since in principle several firms could operate a service. Also, the presence of
deficits in the presence of marginal costs does not automatically mean that natural
monopoly is present. The Mohring effect may be accepted, and marginal cost pricing
may lead to deficits but several firms could be operating. The desired outcome all hinges
on the argument that one firm can provide a better coordinated network, than several
firms. This is a plausible argument, though for busy routes it may be that a natural
oligopoly, not natural monopoly, is the outcome (which is often the case for airlines).
The local bus industry is not directly perfectly contestable. There are barriers to entry in
the form of economies of experience of management and staff, local goodwill, and
differential access to financing arrangements for assets.  Indeed contestability is not a
useful term to use - rather ‘competition for the market’ is a clearer and less ambiguous
construct.
In the absence of direct competition from potential entrants, public intervention is likely
to be required to prevent (natural) monopoly operators from exploiting users. Minimum
levels of service and maximum fares are strategies consistent with this position. Yardstick
self-regulation combined with competitive tendering provides a way of encouraging
efficient practices and ongoing improvements in performance with the ultimate sanction
of competitive tendering when an operator fails to comply with the ever-moving price
and quality controls. The hand of the regulator must be invoked to replicate the ideals of
competition for the market. This is an appropriate mechanism for establishing a
competition policy within the local scheduled bus service industry.
Finally, this discussion says nothing about ownership. Extensive studies undertaken by
Hensher and colleagues over the last 6 years (e.g Hensher and Daniels 1993) suggest
that there are additional gains currently to be made by private provision on urban
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scheduled bus services. However, as all operators, private and public become subject to
a passenger transport Act which embellishes the notion of yardstick competition, given
the natural monopoly (or possibly duopoly or oligopoly) characterisation of the market,
and performance benchmarking, we are likely to see a narrowing of the difference
between overall performance of the private and public operators (as measured by total
factor productivity after adjusting for context differences - see Hensher and Daniels for
details). However this is likely to be achieved when the public operations are reduced in
size with each business unit being a totally independent entity. Governments have been
loath to do this to date, but it is only a matter of time before this will occur. This will
assist in generating healthy potential competition and lead to effective competitive
tendering when the option is exercised.
3.4 Privatisation of Railways: Realistic, Fanciful or even Necessary - A Special Challenge
There is much talk about improving the performance of passenger (and freight) rail
operations throughout the world, but unlike other modes of transport (eg. buses, airlines,
shipping) the winds of privatisation have been anything but receptive.  Is there a case for
selling the assets of Australia's railways to the private sector?  Why is it not happening
overseas? (even Britain is not yet decided on this one)  Part of the answer to the latter is
ideological, and part is simply that railways pose particular degrees of difficulty in
mounting a privatisation move.  Who wants to buy them in their current form?
In the urban passenger context the incumbents exclusive right to run railways is worth
very little and none is likely to challenge through entry.  The story is different for long-
distance passenger (and just-in-time- freight) services as witness by the Very Fast Train
proposal and Freight Forwarders active involvement.  The market for non-subsidised
urban passenger rail operations is nowadays small.  Non-subsidy is currently confined to
some intercity passenger routes and siding-to-siding freight.  By contrast the market for
subsidised commuter rail operations is deemed very important and its demise
unthinkable, even though the impact of eliminating passenger subsidy by large fare
increases will have a negligible impact on road traffic congestion in Australia given the
dominance of passenger kilometres by cars and commercial vehicles.  Privatisation
without a subsidy implies severe contraction in politically sensitive markets.  Maintaining
a subsidy means that there cannot be the required arms-length dealing with the practices
concerned for efficient running of a rail business.
It follows that if rail assets are to be sold off to the private sector then a substitute source
of subsidy must be found. An appealing but radical solution is a recognition that railways
are large landowners, and that if railways were privatised as essentially property
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companies with full rights to develop, sell or buy property, the prospective proceeds may
well suffice to allow an additional constraint to be imposed by way of continuing to
support socially necessary loss-making services. By having variations over time
negotiated through a regulatory process (eg. an office of fair railway trading) the capital
market may be sufficiently interested to raise acceptable bids for a number of companies.
These comments do not imply that railways per se have to be inherently unattractive to
private investors.  The railways as we currently perceive them as inefficient centres for
transport service provision have not always been so.  An alternative less radical (but still
relatively radical) first step to improving the efficiency of a railway is to engender less
protection and more competition.  While admitting that railways compete with cars,
buses and planes for passengers and with trucks, pipelines and ships for freight, this
modal competition has not been enough to make the railways sufficiently efficient in the
sense of improving their performance enough to not rely on subsidy. Indeed the common
response has been a cry for subsidy from government to help them compete! - Level the
playing field at the wrong level!
Then how does one engender competition without privatisation?  The starting point is to
make the railways more manageable for management with better identifiable cost and
revenue centres.  Railways are simply badly structured.  Why for example does the track,
the engineering works, the freight terminals, the railway stations, etc. have to be the
responsibility of a single rail Authority?  Let the track which is shared between urban and
long-distance passenger and freight services be owned by a public (rail) infrastructure
company and have an urban passenger public company lease use of the infrastructure on
an agree/negotiated rate of annual use (this solves the joint cost problem).  Likewise for
engineering and maintenance works.  Then we might start to identify the real costs and
revenues associated with each railway activity, and provide eventually an organisational
structure which is amenable to privatisation if this final step is deemed necessary.
It seems more desirable to use the threat of privatisation initially as a stimulus to change
rather than to embark on actual asset sales.  Assets will be worth a great deal more after
such reorganisation, as indeed any astute entrepreneur would testify.  This is the classic
undervaluation of public assets problem, even recognising the problem of subsidy for
certain socially necessary services.
However even the subsidy issue can be resolved to the benefit of the public purse and
hence society by the adoption of competitive tendering for the supply of services which
require subsidy.  The level of subsidy is likely to be at least 15% lower than currently
outlaid without any restructuring of the railways.  This is a form of privatisation - assets
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are not sold but are managed/operated by the successful tenderer.  Importantly the
successful bid could come from a reconstituted public sector entity but at a lower unit
cost than currently.  With dedicated carriages on one line in and out of the central hub
stations, why not have competitive tendering for the operation of the line passenger
services and rail stations with a rental structure for the use of the hub stations which
could be run by another private or public entity.  This is how airports are run, and even
some long distance coach facilities.
3.5 Joint venturing in Rail Service Provision
Joint ventures have been mooted from time to time as a way of extending the public
purse, which may be relatively advantageous to the private sector partner because of the
taxation benefits not available to the pure private venture.  Section 23(d) of the income
tax act requires that 49 percent of income from any transfer of ownership from the State
public sector to the private sector may have to be paid as tax to the Commonwealth
government.
The private sector is attracted to a joint venture with the public sector only because of
the lower cost of debt capital due to government guarantee. This advantage has to be set
off against the disadvantages of pure government trading enterprises, such as limits on
the supply of debt capital, a limited supply of equity capital and a lower generation of
internal funds because of low profitability. This leads to an implicitly high cost of equity
capital.  The Business Council of Australia has estimated a return on capital for GTE's of
2.7 percent in 1986/87 compared to 14.2 percent for the private sector.
Although the lower cost of debt is an attractive feature of private sector venturing with
the public sector, it must be recognised that whereas GTE's pay the full pre-tax cost of
debt, with income being tax exempt and hence no deductions, the private sector can
reduce their debt cost by a deduction for income tax purposes.  Thus the benefit gap of
joint venturing is not as large as may initially be thought, and may well be cancelled out
entirely. So where is the gain in joint venturing compared to complete private ownership?
The issue of private participation is particularly acute for the State GTE's in contrast to
Commonwealth Government GTE's. The latter is indifferent as to whether it gains
revenue by way of income tax or dividends from its jointly ventured Authorities.  For a
State GTE, private equity can result in 39 percent of the income going to the
Commonwealth, and possibly being returned in part to the State, and the new
shareholders sharing the residual of earnings. The real reason for private sector
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participation must involve issues beyond the financial impediment to raising private
equity capital as a currently constituted GTE, but rather must relate back to the
opportunities for increasing allocative and technical efficiency in fully public GTE's, given
government reluctance to raise taxes to inject more public equity capital or for further
debt funding.
Since tax exempt benefits are an important element of joint venturing, it is important to
have a clear ruling from the income tax act and the Loan Council as to the taxation
implications for private shareholders.  Currently it is quite ambiguous.  When is a joint
venture a private or public trading enterprise?  A possible path might well consider a joint
venture as being wholly subject to public sector tax conditions including interest and
depreciation deductions if the output of the enterprise is a social good.  The simple but
ambiguous criterion is the percent of ownership, with 50 percent the convenience cut-off.
In any transfer of ownership rights in existing GTE's, the value to ascribe to shares (ie.
private equity) is problematic.  Low prices can lead to a strong initial interest, knowing
that there are early windfall gains from assets undervalued in a private market context.
This may have little positive impact on the performance of the enterprise.  High prices
can imply that the new enterprises projected earnings are going to be substantially higher,
and hence there is a higher risk regarding the performance of the enterprise in the future.
The government would most likely have to carry most of this risk, since the private
sector would be rather concerned given the historical performance.
Joint venturing in the context of a new activity may hold out more promise, but then
greater benefits for society may be achieved by complete private ownership or
contracting out to the private sector, with government being responsible to ensure that
the activity fulfils the conditions laid down by government.  This separates the
responsibilities for provision and production, which is often highly desirable.
3.6 Value Capture and Public Transport Financing
An aspect of private participation which has vexed government for many years is the
basis for charging all beneficiaries of transport infrastructure, especially those who gain
from the accessibility benefits attributable to the provision for public transport.  Value
capture or taxing back the induced increases in property values to help finance public
investments has been raised in New South Wales as a legitimate basis for capturing the
hidden subsidy from government to property developers.  This is essentially a capital
gains tax in disguise, which should only be considered if an existing basis of capturing
value is not in place otherwise there will be double counting or double dipping.
Urban Public Transport Futures      David Hensher
Institute of Transport Studies 25 The University of Sydney
Arguably however, if the public transport benefits are capitalised in the property market,
then this must impact on not only the issue of efficiency, but also that of equity.  If value
is captured from owners/occupants near a public transport facility, should value also be
returned to owners/occupants distant from the same facility who perhaps suffer relative
losses?
In establishing a case for a value-added user charge, what I prefer to call an acc ssibility
benefit charge, it is important to recognise that virtually any large capital investment can
have an impact on the property market; and consequently public transport has to be
viewed in the context of the contribution of other important public and private
developments.  Improvements in parking in the city for example can have a beneficial
impact on property values.
Assuming that there is a case for an accessibility-benefit charge in the presence of no
capital gains tax, we should distinguish between two broadly separate dimensions of
value added. The first is the macro benefit of public transport to all property owners
and/or occupants.  The second is the micro benefit of a specific public transport facility
which may have been proposed by the property developer as a necessary feature of the
complete development strategy.  The latter is of particular interest because it represents a
more likely opportunity to capture the contribution that public transport contributes
toward the value of the property and the benefits to the occupants/users of the property.
Given the complex financial linkages between property development, public transport
costs and who actually pays for the development-specific investment in transport
infrastructure and services, it is highly desirable that any negotiations to adjust the
existing public transport supply between developers and government should treat the new
public transport as a separate cost centre.  This enables government to consider the
potential accessibility benefits to a broader set of beneficiaries than simply the initiator of
the proposal.  It also opens up the opportunity for a developer who wishes to go it alone
to establish the full costs of provision of such a facility/service and to consider the gains
from internalising the entire cost into the investment cost of the property.  Cost
awareness is always an important ingredient in any negotiations.
Regardless of the fact that government has a social responsibility to ensure that adequate
public transport is provided to meet social needs, government having established the need
can opt for open bidding on the supply of the facility either through competitive
tendering or some other form of bid which ensures that the service is supplied at the
lowest cost.  Nightride and Countrylink are two recent applications of the competitive
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tendering process in New South Wales.  Given that developers are always likely to argue
that they are not the only beneficiaries from improved public transport, it is wise for
government to never enter into deals whereby the developer has property rights on the
public transport investment.
It is much more preferable to view the public transport supply as a competitively
tendered reviewable provision, avoiding any reneging of supply by the developer, which
is financed from users of the facility.  If the full cost is not recovered from the users then
the market forces will have to be used to extract a contribution from property
owners/occupants as a measure of the benefit they receive.  If they are not prepared to
make a contribution then this is tantamount to the assertion that the service does not
create a direct benefit to them.  Then the case for elimination of the service is clear.
One suspects that deals at the micro-level could become so complex and messy that it is
preferable to consider macro benefit charges. Indeed since government has a social
contract to determine the provision of facilities which will maximise the social benefits of
transportation, if there is a case for expansion on social grounds then it is reasonable to
assume that the beneficiaries will be society as a whole, through many interlinkages:
system wide transport, effects, option value etc.
An appealing accessibility-benefit charge is one directly proportional to the site-specific
rental value per square metre after adjusting for other value added sources.  The number
of persons attracted to a property is a more difficult measure since it would require
estimates of all sources of patronage of a site.  Whereas this may be feasible for sites
which are predominantly employee based, this is very difficult for sites such as a
shopping facility.  Indeed there is no evidence to suggest that the capture value is
dominated by correlation with patronage of the site.  It is not a charge associated with
the number of users of public transport, since accessibility by definition accounts for the
potential for travel, giving public transport and all publicly supplied infrastructure and
support services an option value as well as a direct use value.
This accessibility charge could be a reallocation of existing government revenues (ie. tax
increment financing) if the benefits are already reflected in existing charges or it could be
an additional charge, but unlike other development related micro-level charges it is a
predictable charge on all facilities which benefit by access to public transport.  This
emphasis avoids the intergenerational equity concern that developments in place prior to
the decision to implement impact fees would have a financial advantage over new
proposals.  Furthermore micro-level project specific accessibility charges may have
undesirable locational impacts if the fees are higher in areas which impose greater costs
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on public transport supply; and may well in the long run encourage suburbanisation or
decentralisation of activities.  Whether this is a desirable outcome of the financing
instrument is something that must be decided by government.  The administrative and
legal costs of location-specific accessibility charges are likely to be very high and involve
lengthy delays in negotiation and agreement.
The challenge for government is to identity efficient mechanisms for establishing benefit
charges in order to extract support for public advantage. This requires careful
consideration. The employer tax in Paris is worth close consideration.
4. Conclusions
The adage that "buses are boring, cars spell congestion and trains are sexy" is sufficient
reminder that the shallowness of much of the debate on the future contribution of
particular modes must not be driven by the technological deterministic dreams of the past
or the future.
In this paper we have canvassed a large number of behavioural and institutional issues
which suggest a way in the future. Some of the arguments reflect a path into the future
which is almost irreversible, especially the changing socio-demographic profile of the
population, the changing spatial and temporal arrangement of urban activities, and the
greening of the automobile and energy sectors. All of these developments give the
community greater choices than they have ever had before for mobility and location.
They also give greater challenges to urban public transport to establish a role. Urban
public transport is becoming a supplier of niche services, despite the continued emphasis
on providing across-the-board-services. There is no evidence to support the view that
one form of transport is any more effective in promoting alternative urban forms and
densities - indeed the central stimulus is embellished in a commitment to legislate land
use reform as a package with particular forms of transport infrastructure.
The more uncertain aspects of the future which are a necessary element in the
establishment of choice outcomes, which are both productively and allocatively efficient
in the wider sense of capturing (ie. internalising) the externality effects of decisions
currently made under ‘failed pricing’ and ‘failed regulations’, are the introduction of
transport user charges across all passenger modes, the specialisation of equity
adjustments directed to those in genuine need of assistance, and the implementation of
regulations to ensure that environmental protection is achieved. Another uncertainty is
the continued risk of technological determinism directing urban development rather than
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technological innovations occurring in response to particular demands. The continued
blind commitment to light rail systems throughout Australia is a good example of this
concern.
Public transport operators have got to be more flexible in moving in and out of markets
in response to changing opportunities and needs. The ‘stiffness’ of most public
institutions and the absence of a real market test at present continue to assist in
preserving deep-culture-centred practices from the past. Yardstick competition in the bus
sector provides an important means of breaking down inefficient and ineffective practices
provided that the regulatory mechanisms are strong enough to ensure that benchmarking
has the desired competitive outcome.
The emerging technological and institutional environment in which public transport is
likely to operate should enable the urban public transport sector to become more
efficient. Most progress has been made with urban bus services, although there is a long
way to go. The search for mechanisms to introduce some form of competition is starting
to show benefits, especially in NSW, with Queensland following suit in 1994.
The rail sector is more complex, although the separation of infrastructure from
operations will enable some major progress to be made on the efficient provision of
services. A new set of regulatory arrangements should include the following elements of
a competition policy: (i) regulation of access charges to ensure equity in the treatment of
rival train operators, (ii) the setting of upper limits on the profits from ownership of
infrastructure (even where it is not privatised), best effected by price capping, (iii)
coordination of network activities, including publication of timetables and the oversight
of the allocation of train paths, ticket transferability, and assignment of revenues between
operators, and (iv) the regulation of intermodal aspects especially to give government
policy on externalities. In the very likely event that subsidies will have to be provided for
some years, the regulator must ensure all attractive offers to the potential bidders are
consistent with both reducing subsidy below current levels and in preparing markets for
elimination of subsidy except for ‘community service obligations’. Two possible starting
strategies are to capitalise negative prospective rents (ie pay up front a sum for a bidder
to take over the operations), or to offer a guarantee of a specialised subsidy flow in
advance for a sufficient period to create a market of bidders. There will be a clear need
to pursue a competitive tendering approach for some time to establish a market of buyers
before one even contemplates the possibility of privatisation of train services. The
privatisation of rail stations however may be a more attractive proposition, less
complicated by direct network effects.
Urban Public Transport Futures      David Hensher
Institute of Transport Studies 29 The University of Sydney
The institutional challenge for urban public transport is to seek out opportunities to
investigate alternative ways of engendering efficiency and effectiveness of service
provision. We have made a start, but there is a long way to go. Given the lack of overt
experience in Australia, the careful development of arguments centred on all possibilities
must continue alongside any innovative efforts to undertake real market tests. The final
chapter must remain open for some time.
Urban Public Transport Futures      David Hensher
Institute of Transport Studies 30 The University of Sydney
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